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NOTES
The Priority Conflict Between a Purchase Money Security
Interest and a Prior Security Interest in Future Accounts
Receivable*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code established an
exhaustive scheme for the determination and control of security
interest in personal property and fixtures' which is now the law of all
but one of the states and the District of Columbia Not the least
momentous of the provisions in Article 9 are those that govern
priorities among conflicting security interests in the same collateral.
The purpose of this inquiry is to examine the rules of priority that
the U.C.C. provides for a conflict between the holder of a purchase
money security interest in inventory and proceeds 3 and a holder of a
prior security interest in accounts receivable.4 Conflict between the
security interests of suppliers and bankers is not uncommon in an
economy where many businesses use both trade and bank financing.
In a typical business situation, a retailer finances his business by
obtaining a loan from a bank. In order to secure the loan, the bank is
given an assignment of the retailer's accounts receivable, both
presently existing and arising in the future. Subsequently, the retailer
purchases from a seller a quantity of inventory on credit. The parties
agree that, as security for the outstanding purchase price, the seller
will retain title to the merchandise. The conditional sales contract
empowers the retailer to sell the inventory in the ordinary course of
his business. As a protection to the seller in the case of sales, the
* This note was awarded the Edmund Morgan Prize, given for the best student writing
submitted to the Vanderbilt Law Review during the 1968-69 academic year.
I. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-101, Comment (1962 version) [hereinafter cited as

U.C.C.].
2. Louisiana has not adopted the U.C.C.
3. Section 9-107 of the U.C.C. provides that "[a] security interest is a 'purchase money
security interest' to the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to
secure all or part of its price; or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such

value is in fact so used."
4. Section 9-106 of the U.C.C. defines an "account" as "any right to payment for goods
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel
paper."
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retailer assigns to the seller any claim for the purchase price which he
might acquire by future sale of the inventory. During the weeks that
follow the retailer sells and delivers the inventory to numerous
customers on credit. The principal issue of this investigation, to
express it in terms of this factual situation, is as follows: should the
holder of the security interest in accounts receivable or the subsequent
holder of the purchase money security interest in inventory and proceeds
have the superior claim to the accounts receivable representing the proceeds from the sale of the inventory?
The current provisions of the U.C.C. do not provide a clear
solution to this problem, and in order to determine the proper
solution, this note will briefly explore the historical background of
both the purchase money security interest and accounts receivable
financing in an effort to ascertain the policies underlying each.
Thereafter, a consideration of possible solutions, including those
utilized in non-U.C.C. jurisdictions, will be undertaken in an effort to
determine what resolution of the conflict is most consistent with the
underlying policies of the purchase money security interest and
accounts receivable financing as carried forward in the U.C.C.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The essential feature in the development of accounts receivable
financing has been an effort to establish the integrity of book
accounts as a workable type of collateralP In the process, several
different rules have developed governing accounts receivable financing.
While this development naturally involved the question of priority
between several assignees of the same accounts, it appears that the
principal purpose of the rules was not to entrench particular priorities
but to establish the validity of such an assignment in the first place.
Certainly, this was the central concern of the development from 1925
on, when first Benedict v. Ratne& and then Corn Exchange National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder threatened to bring an end to the

effective use of accounts receivable as collateral. Benedict v. Ratner
required that assignees of book accounts avoid a reservation in the
assignor of dominion inconsistent with effective disposition of title.
5.

For a detailed study of the development of the purchase money security interest, see G.
MORTGAGES (1951); Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REV.
1333 (1963).
6. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
7. 318 U.S. 434 (1943).

OSBORNE,
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Klauder, on the other hand, created the possibility that assignments of
book accounts would be treated as voidable preferences under section
60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act s if perfection were not accomplished as

against a good faith purchaser more than four months prior to the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy. The reaction to the Klauder

decision was an adoption of the so-called New York rule by those
states that did not already follow it. The New York rule gave priority,
as between several assignees of the same accounts receivable, to the

one who was first in time regardless of whether notice had been given
to the debtor of the subsequent assignee.9 The fact that Klauder forced
the wholesale adoption of new priority rules in many states supports the
conclusion that the principal objective behind the development of
accounts receivable financing was the legal recognition and security of

such financing-the accompanying priority rules being but a necessary
consequence of the principal undertaking. 0
At the same time, the fundamental characteristic underlying the
development of the purchase money security interest has been the
establishment of a rule of priority-a rule that gives priority to a
purchase money security interest even as against antecedent claims.
As early as 1631," the courts recognized that the purchase money
security interest should be afforded a unique status. From the
beginning there was little question but that a seller could take a
security interest or mortgage covering property delivered to the
purchaser. Consequently, the principal concern in the development of
8. As amended by the Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act
read: "A preference is a transfer, as defined by this Act, of any of the property of a debtor to or
for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such
debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition
in bankruptcy . . . the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class. For the purposes of
subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at the time
when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor
could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of
the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy. . it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy." 318 U.S. at
435-36, citing52 Stat. 840, 869-70, II U.S.C. § 96(a)(l)-(2) (1964).
9. See, e.g., Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882). See also MacDonald v. Kneeland,

5 Minn.
Young,
adopted
10.

352 (1861); Meier v. Hess, 23 Or. 599, 32 P. 755 (1893); Brander, Williams & Co. v.
12 Tex. 332 (1854); and Tingle v. Fisher, 20 W.Va. 497 (1882), where other courts
the New York rule.
For an account of the rash of so-called validation statutes that followed in the wake of

the Klauder decision, see Craig, Accounts Receivable Financing:A Reappraisal of Validation

Statutes in Light ofAnmended 60 (a), 65 HARV. L. REV. 627 (1952).
II. See Nash v. Preston, 79 Eng. Rep. 767 (1631).
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the purchase money security interest was not one of establishing the
validity of the interest but of determining the position it should
occupy in relation to other security interests in the same collateral.
Because the purchase money secured party supplies his own collateral
and because of the desirability of maintaining an unhindered flow of
goods in the usual course of trade, a priority for the purchase money
security interest has been recognized even as against antecedent
claims. 12 The only real controversy in its development concerned the
extent to which the purchase money priority should be given such
recognition. Decisions on this point suggest that only in the very
narrow class of cases where the property sold subsequently becomes
attached to realty and is not susceptible of removal without serious
harm to the freehold should the purchase money priority be denied.
As for inventory, there appears to be no restriction whatsoever on a
seller's right to take a purchase money security interest superior to all
other claims of creditors.
The U.C.C. carries forward these fundamental policies underlying
the development of both accounts receivable financing and the
purchase money security interest. The U.C.C. recognizes the validity
of a security interest in "any right to payment for goods sold." '
Thus the principal purpose behind the development of accounts
receivable financing-the establishment of book accounts as valid
collateral-is preserved and continued under the U.C.C. and applies
to future as well as existing accounts. t4 Likewise, the fundamental
feature of the purchase money security interest as it finally developed
under pre-U.C.C. law is provided for by sections 9-312(3) and (4)
which give a purchase money secured party who follows the necessary
steps priority over all competing security interests in the property
sold. The potential for the conflict, however, is far from resolved by
the U.C.C.'s many provisions governing priority of security interests.
III.

THE

UNIFORM

COMMERICAL

CODE-

DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

CONFLICT

A.

Creation of a Security Interest in Existing and Future A ccounts
Receivable
Prior to the U.C.C., the field of secured transactions was
characterized by the development of a wide variety of security
12.
U.S. 167
13.
14.

See Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914); Porter v. Pittsburgh Bessemer Steel Co., 122
(1887); United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1871).
U.C.C. § 9-106.
Id. § 9-204(2)(d).
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devices. 5 The pre-U.C.C. evolution of two of these-the purchase
money security interest and accounts receivable financing-was
examined in some detail since they constitute the focal point of the
priority conflict to be examined and because the interests, as they
finally developed, were, for the most part, incorporated into the
general scheme of Article 9.11
Assuming the existence of an assignment of existing and future
accounts receivable from the retailer to the bank in exchange for
credit, the creation of a perfected security interest in accounts
receivable requires adherence to several essential steps set forth in the
Code.' 7 To perfect a security interest in accounts, which the Code
defines as "any right to payment for goods sold,' 88 the interest must
attach, and all applicable steps required for perfection must be
taken.' 9 In the case of a security interest in accounts receivable, the
step required for perfection is the filing of a financing statement"0
unless the assignment embraces only an insignificant part of the
assignor's outstanding accounts.2 ' Consequently, most assignnients
require such a filing if they are to be perfected. While a copy of the
security agreement itself may be filed, the financing statement is
adequate and requires only the signatures and addresses of the parties
and a description of the collateral 2 Any description that reasonably
identifies the collateral is adequate for this purpose2 3
Although the filing procedure is a fairly simple requirement and
easily accomplished, the secured party will have no enforceable claim
in any property to which the security interest has not attached 4 There
15. The adoption of Article 9 was accompanied by the repeal of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and any acts regulating chattel mortgages, factor's liens
or assignments of accounts receivable. U.C.C. § 10-102(1).
16. Under the U.C.C., the traditional distinctions among security devices were not
retained. Article 9 applies to all transactions intended to create a security interest in personal
property. Id. § 9-101, Comment. This does not abolish the pre-U.C.C. security devices such as
the conditional sale, but simply makes it subject to the rules of Article 9. Id. § 9-102, Comment
2.
17. Id. § 9-102, Comment 2.
18. Id. § 9-106.
19. Id. § 9-303.

20. Id. § 9-302(l).
21. This exception "is to save from ex post facto invalidation casual or isolated assignments. . . . [Yet] [a]ny person who regularly takes assignments of any debtor's accounts shoufd
file." Id. § 9-302, Comment 5.
22. Id. § 9-402.
23. Id. § 9-110.
24. Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 119,
127 (1957).
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are three prerequisites to an attachment:25 (1) an agreement that the
security interest attach, (2) a giving of value by the assignee, and (3) a
right of the debtor or assignor in the collateral 2 The third element
necessary for an attachment-a right of the debtor in the
collateral-comes into existence only when the account comes into
existence.2 1 Consequently, where an assignment of accounts is taken,
assuming the other elements have been satisfied, the debtor's security
interest will, at the time of the transaction, attach only to existing
accounts.
Prior to the U.C.C., the courts occasionally proved antagonistic
28
to the practice of assigning a security interest in future accounts.
Furthermore, a similar hostility was not unknown in pre-U.C.C.
29
legislation such as that which followed Klauder.
The U.C.C., on the
other hand, gives its endorsement to such financing, so that where an
assignment is made of both existing and future receivables, the
assignee's security interest, again assuming all other requirements are
complied with, will attach to the future accounts at the moment they
come into existence.30
As often occurred before the U.C.C., a situation may arise where
several creditors have taken security interests in the same accounts
receivable. The U.C.C. sets forth three rules that govern all questions
of priority among these interests. First, where, as between such
security interests, one is perfected and the other unperfected, the party
claiming under the perfected interest has priority 1l Because a secured
party cannot take possession of accounts receivable, any perfection of a
security interest in such collateral must be accomplished by filing a
financing statement?2 Accordingly, the second rule, which applies to the
situation where there is a conflict between two or more perfected
security interests, 33 resolves any conflict between such interests by
25.

"Attachnment is the term of art employed by Article 9 to describe those rights which a

secured party has in collateral upon creation of the security interest. .

.

. Perfection, on the

other hand, is a Code term of art which describes the rights a secured party has in collateral and
regulates those rights as they may come into contact or conflict with the rights of third persons,
such as buyers from or judgment creditors of, the debtor." 0. SPIVACK. SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 33 (3d ed. 1963).
26. U.C.C. § 9-204.
27. Id. § 9-204(2)(d).
28. See Taylor v. Barton Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N.E. 43 (1917).
29. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 107A, § 1 (1946) (repealed 1957).
30. U.C.C. § 9-204(2)(d).
31. Id. § 9-301(I)(a).
32. Id. § 9-302(l)(a) recognizes a perfected security interest without filing in cases where
the collateral is possessed by the secured party under section 9-305.
33. Id. § 9-312(5)(a).
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simply giving priority according to the order of filing 4 The third rule
applies in the situation where a conflict arises involving two or more
interests that have not been perfected. In such a case the U.C.C. looks
to the order of attachment to resolve questions of priority. With
respect to existing accounts receivable, a creditor's security interest
will attach under section 9-204(1) when he has given value pursuant to
an agreement which provides that a security interest shall attach. In
effect, where a conflict develops between unperfected security interests
in accounts receivable which existed when the agreements were entered
into, the U.C.C. follows the view that existed under the New York
Rule, namely, that a first assignee has priority over a subsequent
taker. This rule applies to security interests in future accounts as well.
However, it should be noted that the requirements imposed by section
9-204(1), by their nature, make attachment impossible prior to the
5
time the accounts are created?
The foregoing suggests that the U.C.C.'s favorable treatment of
accounts receivable financing affords creditors the opportunity to
obtain a valuable security interest in both existing and future
accounts. Moreover, such a security interest is not made invalid by
reason of a debtor's liberty to exercise control over and dispose of the
collateral.
When a creditor, for example a bank, has filed a
financing statement and advanced money to the retailer under a
written agreement that the bank will have a security interest in all
existing and future accounts receivable of the retailer, it has, under the
provisions just examined, attained the most advantageous position
against subsequent creditors provided by the U.C.C. Such a position
would normally assure priority as against persons subsequently taking
a security interest in the same accounts. Yet the U.C.C., as did the
common law cases examined earlier, established rules that afford
favored treatment for those claiming under a purchase money security
interest and thereby create a possible source of dissipation to an
otherwise invulnerable interest.
34. Id.
35. Application of this rule might prove difficult where several assignees had completed all
steps required for attachment but the taking by the debtor of an interest in the collateral. In
such a situation all the security interests would be perfected simultaneously upon the creation of
future accounts. The obvious solution in such a case would be a filing by one of the parties,
thereby gaining priority under the first rule.
36. U.C.C. § 9-205 & Comments.
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Creation of a Subsequent Purchase Money Security Interest in
Inventory and Proceeds

The purchase money security interest has long been a favored
child of the law. The few limitations that the common law placed on
its generally accepted priority over antecedent claims in the same
collateral were, as pointed out earlier, restricted to the fixture cases,
and even then the, denial of priority was not absolute Because none
of the limitations imposed by the common law suggested any
restriction on the priority of a purchase money security interest in
inventory, it is not surprising that the U.C.C. adopted special priority
rules to protect a purchase money interest in such collateral." With
the bank holding a perfected security interest in future accounts
receivable and perhaps other creditors holding perfected security
interests in the retailer's after-acquired inventory,"9 the absence of
special treatment for a purchase money secured party might prove fatal
to the retailer's efforts to obtain new inventory on credit. But, under
the U.C.C., our seller can make a delivery of goods to the retailer for
resale and, by utilizing the provisions available, assure himself of
priority over all antecedent and subsequent security interests in the
inventory sold and perhaps the proceeds as well.
To obtain a purchase money security interest in inventory
collateral that will prevail over other creditors, the U.C.C. requires
that two conditions be met. First, the security interest must be
perfected at the time the inventory passes to the debtor.4 0 Since by its
very nature a sale of inventory contemplates possession of the same
by the purchaser, perfection requires the filing of a financing
statement 4 in addition to attachment of the security interest."
Attachment, as in the case of the bank's security interest in accounts
receivable, is accomplished when there is an agreement that the
security interest attach, value is given, and the debtor has a right in
37. See Detroit Steel Co. v. Sisterville Brewing Co., 233 U.S. 712 (1914).
38. The pre-U.C.C. device used to create a purchase money interest depended to some
extent on the nature of the collateral, but the trust receipt was the commonly accepted
instrument to establish a purchase money interest in business inventory. See Coogan. Article 9 0J
The Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Aiong Secured Creditors and "The Floating Lien,"
72 HARV. L. REv. 838, 843 (1959).

39. U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
40. Id. § 9-312(3)(a). Note that a purchase money security interest in collateral other than
inventory need not be perfected at the time the debtor takes possession, but need only be
accomplished within ten days thereof. Id. § 9-312(4).
41. Id. § 9-302(l).
42. Id. § 9-303(l).
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tlie inventory' 3 The second condition necessary to the perfection of a
purchase money security interest is a giving of notice by the secured
party to other individuals who might have a security interest in the
same collateral. Specifically, such notice must be given to any person
who has a security interest that is actually known to the holder of the
purchase money security interest and to any person who has filed a
financing statement covering the same type of inventory prior to the
filing of the purchase money security interest.44 To be effective, the
notification must contain a description of the property45 and state that
the individual giving the notice has or expects to acquire a purchase
money security interest in the inventory of the debtor.
With these general rules in mind, let us turn now to a
consideration of the specific steps required of the seller if he is to
assure priority of his security interest as against the bank's interest in
the retailer's future accounts receivable. When inventory is delivered
to a debtor, the secured party gives an implied, if not expressed,
authorization that the collateral may be sold.46 The effect of such an
authorization is to surrender any claim in the inventory as against one
who makes a purchase from the debtor in the ordinary course of
business. 47 Consequently, it is not only practical but necessary, if the
seller is to maintain any collateral at all, that his security interest
reach the proceeds as well as the inventory itself.' The policy
considerations fundamental to the recognition of a priority in a
purchase money security interest in inventory-among them the
assurance of a continuing flow of needed goods to struggling
businesses-would, in large part, be thwarted if such protection were
not allowed. In response to this need, the U.C.C. provides for the
extension of a purchase money security interest in inventory, with
continuous perfection, to proceeds. 9 This may be accomplished in one
of two ways. The secured party may perfect his security interest in the
43. Id. § 9-204(1).
44. Id. § 9-312(3)(b).
45.
d. § 9-312(3)(c).
46. Inventory is defined as -[g]oods. . held. . for sale or lease or to be furnished under
contracts of service." Id. § 9-109(4).
47. Id. § 9-306(2).
48. The official comments suggest that it may not always be wise to include, as the
U.C.C. allows one to do, a claim in the original financing statement to a security interest in
proceeds. The danger suggested is that in cases where the original collateral is by its nature not
normally delivered to a debtor with authority to resell, a claim to proceeds might be construed
as an authorization and result in the loss, upon resale, of any claim to the collateral as against
the purchaser. U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 3.
49. Id. § 9-306(3).
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procceds at any time within ten days of their creation,"0 but this,
particularly in the case of a security interest in inventory, would
involve close attention to the debtor's business operations and
probably the filing of a new financing statement every ten days. The
preferable alternative approach for the holder of a security interest in
inventory is simply to include in the original financing statement
language that covers 'proceeds as well as the inventory.5' While the
value of such a security interest might otherwise be eroded by the
difficulties of tracing proceeds that have been commingled or
deposited in a bank account, 52 accounts receivable are comparatively
easy to trace and therefore, together with the fact that a large part of
present day proceeds are in that form, constitute a most attractive
type of collateral.
In addition to the assertion in his original financing statement of
a claim to a security interest in the proceeds, 3 the seller must be
certain that any person who is holding a security interest in the
retailer's accounts receivable and who has recorded under an earlier
financing statement is given notice of the intended security interest
before the inventory is delivered to the retailer. Usually section 93 12(3)(b) would require only that such notice be given to persons with
security interests in the inventory itself if the purchase money security
interest is drafted to cover only inventory. But where the original
financing statement claims an interest in the proceeds as well, holders
of security interests in future accounts receivable come within the
class of creditors intended to be protected by the requirement of
notification. The essential purpose of notification is to protect secured
parties who typically rely upon a continuous flow of new collateral to
replace that extinguished in the ordinary course of business activity. 1
According to our hypothetical, the seller would be under an obligation
to give such notice to the bank. Failure to do so would leave the bank
with a priority in any of the retailer's accounts receivable not made
subject to seller's security interest within ten days after their
creation.55 Likewise, the failure of either the bank or the seller to
follow one of the essential steps outlined would result in a fairly
50. Id. § 9-306(3)(b).
51. Id. § 9-306(3)(a).
52. A security interest in proceeds is limited to those, both cash ard non-cash, that arc
identifiable. Id. § 9-306(4)(a) & (b).
53. This step meets the requirements of both id. §§ 9-312(3)(c) and 9-306(3)(a).
54. See id. § 9-312, Comment 3.

55.

Id. § 9-306(3)(b).
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routine solution to any dispute concerning the retailer's future
accounts receivable5 Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the
situation where the bank and the seller have both followed all the
steps outlined.
C.

The Conflict Under the Uniform Commercial Code

The uncertainty concerning the solution to the hypothetical
arises from the antithetic interpretations that can be given to sections
9-306 and 9-312. The general purpose of section 9-306 is to give a
secured party a continuously perfected security interest in any
proceeds resulting from the debtor's sale of the original collateral.
Under one view of the section, it might be concluded that the purpose
of giving a "continuously perfected" security interest was merely to
afford the party with a security interest in the original collateral the
advantage of his perfection date for the original collateral. 7 If this is
the sole 'function of section 9-306, the bank would retain a priority
over the seller if the respective rights of the parties were determined by
the order of filing5 On the other hand, section 9-306, if viewed not
simply as giving a secured party the advantage of an earlier filing date
but also an extension to proceeds of the security interest as it existed
in the original collateral, a different result would follow. Under this
view, the seller would enjoy the benefit of the favored treatment
afforded, a purchase money secured party and take priority over the
bank 9
A difficulty with the second approach to section 9-306 results
from the fundamental nature of section 9-312(3)-the sole provision
from which the seller derives the status necessary to prevail over the
bank. While section 9-306 speaks of extending a security interest to
cover proceeds, section 9-312(3) does not create a security interest.
Rather, its fundamental role is the determination of priorities-a
matter not mentioned in the former section. Consequently, objection
might be made that the benefit derived from section 9-312(3) is not
intended to be continued by section 9-306. The answer to this is
obvious. While it is true that section 9-306 speaks only of continuing
a security interest in proceeds, this is, in effect, nothing more than a
56. Id. §§ 9-301 & 9-312.
57. The advantage would be to allow the secured party to prevail over creditors who took
security interests in the same collateral subsequent to the secured party's original perfection or
filing but prior to the time he would otherwise have perfected a new interest in the proceeds.
58. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a).
59. Id. § 9-312(3).
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continuation of one's claim in the original collateral and, as such,
essentially a question of priorities. "
Having made these general observations concerning the difficulty
of the dilemma, the focus turns now to a more detailed consideration
of the probable solution to our hypothetical under the present Code.
One suggested solution turns on the pivotal determination of how the
purchase money secured party's security interest in the proceeds is
perfected." Recall that the seller filed a financing statement that
claimed a security interest in the inventory sold to the retailer and
included, in addition, any proceeds resulting from the sale thereof.
Upon the sale by the retailer of any of the inventory, the security
interest therein having been perfected, the seller would have a
continuously perfected security interest in the proceeds according to
section 9-306 .2 Had the original financing statement not been drafted
to include a security interest in the proceeds, section 9-306(3)(b) would
require the seller to file a new statement within ten days to retain his
security interest beyond that time. Accordingly, for up to ten days the
seller would, assuming a perfected security interest in the inventory
itself, have a perfected security interest in the proceeds without any
need for filing. 3 The fact that filing is immaterial to the seller's
security interest during this ten day period is substantiated by
additional language to the effect that "[a] financing statement must be
filed to perfect all security interests except . . . a security interest
temporarily perfected . . . in proceeds for a 10 day period under
section 9-306 . ...,1'
If perfection for this ten day period is treated
as accomplished without filing, it would seem a tenable position that
perfection might be viewed as resulting from means other than filing.
In particular, perfection of the seller's security interest in proceeds
may be said to be the consequence, not of filing, but of the facd that
his original perfected security interest covered proceeds. Under the
60. The U.C.C. states that "[s]ecurity interest means an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id. § 1-201(37).
61. This solution is suggested by Charles C. Craig. Mr. Craig's hypothetical differs from
the instant one in that there the party taking the security interest in accounts receivable did so
after delivery to the debtor of inventory. According to the situation presented by Mr. Craig,
however, the security interest in the accounts receivable was filed before that of the person
selling the inventory, and thus the solution suggested there is applicable to our situation. Craig,
Accounts Receivable Financing: Transition front Variety to Uniform Commercial Code, 42
B.U.L. REV. 187, 201 et seq. (1962).

62. U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
63. Id. § 9-306(3)(b).
64. 'Id. § 9-302(l)(b).
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provisions of section 9-312, when there is a conflict between secured
parties holding security interests in the same collateral, unless both
interests are perfected by filing, the determination of priorities is
based on the order of perfection. 5 At this point it is important to note
that while our hypothetical involves two conflicting claims to identical
accounts receivable, the bank's claim is made to the accounts as
original collateral while the claim of the seller is made to the accounts
as proceeds. This distinction becomes critical in light of the different
rules for perfection in original collateral and proceeds. As was noted
earlier, the bank took its security interest before the seller became
involved with the retailer and was, as between the two, the first to file
a financing statement. Yet, his interest in future accounts receivable
did not become perfected until after the seller's since perfection
requires attachment and this, in turn, could not take place with regard
to future accounts receivable until they came into existence. 66
According to our hypothetical, the seller's security interest was
perfected at the time the inventory was delivered to the retailer. Since
section 9-306(3) gives the seller a continuously perfected security
interest in the proceeds, the perfection of his interest in the proceeds
also occurred on the date that the retailer .received the inventory.
Consequently, the seller had a perfected security interest in the
retailer's future accounts receivable before they existed and, therefore,
necessarily before the bank could have perfected his interest in them.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, and according to a leading
authority in the field it is "a pefectly plausible . . . and perhaps the
preferable reading, '6 7 the U.C.C. would always give priority in such a
situation to the purchase money secured party if he had included a
security interest in proceeds in his original financing statement 6s or
perfected a security 'interest in the accounts within ten days of their
creation.69 On the other hand, it has been observed that section 9-312
(6) may invalidate the whole theory.7 ° That section states that for
purposes of the priority provisions in section 9-312(5) a continuously
65. Id. § 9-312(5)(b). The section expressly applies to cases of purchase money security
interests that do not qualify for the special treatment afforded by sections 9-312(3) & (4).
66. Id. § 9-204(2)(d).
67. JOINT COMM'N ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
AND THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY ON BANKING AND
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 214 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as ALI-ABA Course.].

68. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(a).
69. Id. § 306(3)(b).
70.

ALI-ABA COURSE, supra note 67, at 216.
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perfected security interest shall be treated at all times as though
perfected by filing if it was originally perfected in that manner."
Consequently, because the seller's original security interest was
perfected by filing, section 9-312(6) would require that the continuously
perfected security interest claimed under section 9-306(3)(b) be treated
as perfected by filing. Thus, in an effort to establish priority over the
bank, the seller would be unable to rely on section 9-312(5)(b) and the
fact that his security interest in the accounts receivable was perfected
before that held by the bank. Instead, the outcome would depend on
other considerations.
Another approach has been suggested that would also give the
seller priority over the bank, even if section 9-312(6) precludes the use
of a "first to perfect" priority rule 2 Fundamentally, the approach is
based on a policy determination that the favored treatment afforded a
purchase money secured party by section 9-312(3) ought to be
preserved in the proceeds as well. Consequently, under this approach,
section 9-306(3) is simply read as though it provides that a "security
interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest" 7 and
entitled to the same priority given the security interest in the original
collateral. The effect is to make the solution to our hypothetical rest
on an application of section 9-312(3) to the extent that it modifies the
"first to file" rule of section 9-312(5)(a).7 4 As observed earlier, section
9-312(3) gives a purchase money security interest in inventory priority
over holders of antecedent security interests, but only to the extent
that they cover the "same collateral." Assuming the prerequisites required by section 9-312(3) have been followed, the seller's claim to
priority over the bank would depend on whether the proceeds collected
by the retailer constituted, within the meaning of section 9-312(3), the
"same collateral" as the inventory sold. Since section 9-306 may be read
as treating proceeds as the same collateral-though admittedly in a
somewhat different form-it is not an unreasonable conclusion that the
proceeds do, in fact, constitute the "same collateral" within the meaning
of section 9-312(3) !5 Consequently, the seller would have priority over
71. U.C.C. § 9-312(6).
72. The solution is that offered by Professor Grant Gilmore of the University of Chicago
Law.School. See ALI-ABA COURSE, supra note 67, at 214.

73.

U.C.C. § 9-306(3).

74.

Such an interpretation of section 9-306(3) cannot result from a literal reading of the

provision, but requires one to interpolate. However, this is not objectionable since one must
always interpolate to derive a clear understanding of a provision, and moreover, the conclusion
reached in the instant case is probably the intended result. ALI-ABA COURSE, supra note 67, at
215. (comments of Professor Gilmore).
75. Id. at 216.
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the bank in any accounts receivable created by the retailer's sale of the
seller's original collateral.P6
Though the views expressed to this point suggest that the seller
should prevail under current provisions of the U.C.C., there is
substantial support for the opposite conclusion. 77 As was noted in the
approach last examined, section 9-312(3) gives the seller priority over
the bank only in the same collateral. The seller's priority under that
view depended on the conclusion that the proceeds resulting from sale
of the seller's original collateral was "the same collateral" within the
meaning of section 9-312(3). An equally legitimate position is to view
the words "the same collateral" as expressing the rule that a purchase
money secured party's priority shall not extend to accounts receivable
as proceeds. 78 The adoption of this view, together with the position
that section 9-312(6) requires the application of a "first to file"
priority rule in the resolution of our hypothetical, results in the
conclusion that the bank should prevail. But even this solution is not
free from difficulty. Under this approach, the position that proceeds is
not the same collateral as the inventory gives credence to the
suggestion that the seller's security interest in the proceeds be treated
as a different security interest, though continuously perfected by
section 9-306(3), that is perfected by the fact that the original security
interest included language to cover proceeds. In other words, the first
premise required under this approach militates against the second and
suggests that a "first to perfect" rule should determine the priorities
of the bank and the seller. As was pointed out, this would result in an
outcome favorable to the seller.
Under current U.C.C. provisions, the solution to our
hypothetical is anything but certain, 79 and "there is no rational way
76. While Professor Gilmore first adopted the foregoing as the appropriate solution to our
hypothetical, he has since taken the position that the party holding the security interest in
accounts receivable as original collateral, the bank, should prevail. Id. at 215.
77. Not only has Professor Gilmore been converted to this point of view, but such
outstanding authorities as Peter F. Coogan, member of the Massachusetts Bar and Planning
Chairman of the 1967 Advanced ALI-ABA Course on Banking and Secured Transactions
Under the Uniform Comnmercial Code, and William E. Hogan, Professor at Cornell Law
School, have suggested that the priority given a purchase money secured party by section 9312(3) does not extend to proceeds. See id. at 215-16.

78.

"i think that [a contrary view] is pretty frightening. Section 9-312(3) says that the

purchase money man gets his priority over a conflicting security interest 'in the same collateral'.

I take it that that means the thing doesn't spill over onto the accounts." Id. at 216 (remarks of
Professor Hogan).
79. "Now, the Code just doesn't give an answer. You can rationalize any one of several
answers, but there is no result which you can say a court must reach on this point." Id. at 215
(remarks of Mr. Coogan).

1172

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 22

of reaching a clear solution or giving a good opinion of counsel." 8
Because of this uncertainty from both the accounts receivable and the
inventory financer's point of view, a consideration of possible
alternatives seems appropriate.

IV.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

A. The Civil Law
The first alternative to be considered is the solution that exists
under the law of Louisiana-the only state that has not adopted the
U.C.C. In Louisiana the solution to our hypothetical rests on a
consideration of two statutes-the Accounts Receivable Act' and the
Chattel Mortgage Act. 2 The former statute was adopted in 1952 and
governs the assignment of accounts receivable. 3 The Accounts
Receivable Act recognizes the validity of any written assignment of
accounts made for a valuable consideration provided it takes place
within the effective period of the "statement of assignment"'" required
to be filed as notice of the transaction. Thus the Act recognizes the
validity of an agreement that includes future accounts. The
assignment becomes fully perfected on the date that the assignment is
made, 8 meaning the time at which each individual account, after it
has come into existence, is assignedY Consequently, under the civil
law as applied in Louisiana, the bank in both our hypothetical and
under the U.C.C., could take an interest in future accounts receivable
from the retailer, the interest being perfected as it was actually
assigned.
Louisiana's civil law also affords the seller the opportunity to
acquire a "security interest" in inventory he might sell to a retailer.
80.

81.
82.

Id. at 215 (comment of Professor Gilmore).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3101-10 (Supp. 1969).
Id. §§ 9:5351-66 (1950, Supp. 1969).

83. The historical development of non-notification accounts receivable financing is based
on the civil code provisions concerning pledge. Id. §§ 9:4321-23 (1950). See Comment, Security
Rights in Movables under the Uniform Commercial Code and Louisiana Law-A Transactional
Comparison, 40TUL. L. REV. 744, 857 (1966).
84. The statement is effective for a period of two years. Thereafter a new filing may be
made to acquire an additional period. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3106 (Supp. 1969).
85. Id. §§ 9:3102& 9:3103.
86. Id. § 9:3102.
87. "Therefore, in Louisiana, under a strict reading of the statute, priority is established

in two distinct steps: A statement of assignment is filed. Then a written assignment to the party
named in the statement is made after the accounts come into existence but within the effective
period of the statement." Comment, supra note 83, at 868.
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Under the French Civil Code, a nonpossessory interest in movables
was unknown, and consequently under the subsequent Louisiana Civil
Code, the sole means of creating a consensual security interest in
movables was by pledge."8 The Chattel Mortgage Act now provides,
however, that a mortgage may be taken in "stocks of merchandise, or
other things in bulk, [though] changing in specifics, including without
limitation, stocks of merchandise in retail, wholesale or
manufacturing establishments." 8 To perfect the interest against third
persons, the seller need only follow the steps set out in the ActY0
Nevertheless, there is a fundamental distinction between the interest
that the seller would acquire under Louisiana law and that afforded
by the U.C.C. We have examined in detail the favored treatment
afforded a purchase money secured party under both the commonlaw
and the U.C.C. The only advantage given to such a party under the
law of Louisiana is a so-called "vendor's privilege" on movables. The
Civil Code provides that "[h]e who has sold to another any movable
property, which is not paid for, has a preference on the price of his
property, over the other creditors of the purchaser, whether the sale
was made on a credit or without, if the property still remains in the
possession of the purchaser."'" Accordingly, once any property
delivered by the seller to the retailer leaves the retailer's possession,
the Louisiana law terminates whatever security interest the seller
might have in the collateral.12 But more important and determinative
of our hypothetical conflict is the fact that the civil law of Louisiana
denies the seller any security interest in proceeds.93 Consequently, in
the hypothetical situation, the bank would have the sole security
interest in accounts receivable resulting from the retailer's sale of the
seller's collateral.94
88. Comment, supra note 83, at 876.
89. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5351 (Supp. 1969).
90. Id. § 9:5353 (Supp. 1969) requires (1) authentication, (2) filing, and (3) payment of a
nominal recording fee.
91. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3227 (West 1952) (emphasis added).
92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5354 (Supp. 1969) (provided there has been a proper filing).
93. For a full consideration of the solution to our hypothetical under Louisiana law, see
supra note 83, at 873.
94. A similar outcome seems to result under the law of France as well. The French Civil
Code provides that a debtor may assign all claims, actions, or future rights not otherwise made
non-tranferable or prohibited by law. Since an assignment of existing and future accounts
receivable is not prohibited, the bank could, presumably, take an assignment of the retailer's
accounts. Because French law has rejected the concept of a mortgage on inventory, however, the
only interest that the French civil law affords the seller is a "vendor's privilege" similar to that
existing under Louisiana law. In France, then, as in Louisiana, the bank would take its security
interest in the retailer's accounts receivable without challenge from the seller. See Sachse, Using
Inventory as Security: A Civil-Law Perspective,39 TUL. L. REV. 397, 404 et seq. (1965).
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The most obvious advantage derived from the civil law approach
to our hypothetical is simply the fact that the conflict encountered
under the U.C.C. is avoided. Consequently, both the bank and the
seller are permitted to enter into transactions such as that hypothesized without the uncertainty that would otherwise face them. The civil
law approach, however, fails to remedy the difficulty that, perhaps, is
the strongest argument in favor of a purchase money security interest
and, especially in the case of inventory, a right to continue the security
interest to proceeds-namely, the importance of making a continued
flow of goods on credit available to a businessman who, because of
prior encumbrances, might not otherwise be able to acquire such goods
and would consequently become a business casualty.
B.

Canada (The Ontario Act)

A sharp contrast to the civil law alternative is now
developing in Canada. There is no single body of commercial law that
can be said to govern throughout the Commonwealth. Instead, each
province presently has its own provisions governing assignments of
accounts receivable and security interests in inventory. However, in
recent years there has developed a recognition of the need for greater
uniformity of commercial law among the various provinces of the
Commonwealthf 5 The recently enacted Personal Property Security
Act of Ontario96 has received a favorable response in several of the
provinces and may well become the nucleus of any subsequent
movement toward uniformity 7 It is this statute that offers another
alternative to the dilemma posed by our hypothetical.
The Ontario solution is quite simple. The Act provides that "a
purchase money security interest in inventory or its proceeds has
priority over any other security interest in the same collateral, if..."
certain steps are taken by the secured party at the time the security
8
interest is created.9
Consequently, while the civil law has adopted a policy that gives
assignees of accounts receivable priority by excluding sellers of
inventory from taking a security interest in proceeds, the Ontario Act
95. A committee was established in 1963 by the Commercial Law Section of the Canadian
Bar Association for the purpose of assisting in the development of a uniform act on security
interest in personal property.
96. STATUTES OF ONTARIO, ch. 73 (1967) [hereinafter cited as P.P.S.A.].

97. Alberta's legislature has given consideration to the Ontario Act and the provinces of
Manitoba and Saskatchewan have expressed interest in such a statute. See Ziegel, The Draft
Uniform Personal Property Security Act, II CAN. BAR J. 270, 272 (1968).
98. P.P.S.A., supra note 96, at § 34(2) (emphasis added).
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has moved to the other extreme by giving a purchase money secured
interest priority over all competing security interests whether in the
original collateral or proceeds.
Like the civil law solution, the Ontario Act dispells any
uncertainty concerning the outcome of a contest between the bank and
the seller over the retailer's accounts receivable. In addition, the
Ontario Act leaves a businessman such as the retailer with an
unhindered ability to acquire the inventory or other goods needed to
carry on a successful business venture.
Necessarily, the giving of such broad protection to a purchase
money secured party results in a detriment to the security interest of a
party who takes an assignment of accounts receivable. Because
accounts receivable have become one of the most significant assets of
the contemporary businessman and one often used as a vehicle for
obtaining credit, the policy decision as to which interest should prevail
is not without difficulty.
Certainly, valid arguments can be advanced in support of a
priority for either security interest, but there are two significant points
which suggest that the alternative embodied in the Ontario Act is
more consistent with Article 9 as it now exists than that found under
the civil law. First, there is the similarity of the two statutes. The
general schemes of both Article 9 and the Ontario Act are analogous
in that each undertakes to establish a comprehensive system for the
regulation of all security interests in personal property and fixtures. In
addition to this similarity, a substantial portion of the language in the
two acts is nearly identical.99 In particular, only the addition to
section 9-312(3) of the words "or its proceeds" would be required to
incorporate under Article 9 the solution embodied in the Ontario
Act.' More important, however, than the literal similarity of the two
statutes is the fact that the result reached under the Ontario Act, if
incorporated into the U.C.C., would give effect to the generally
favorable treatment given a purchase money security interest by
Article 9 and reach a result seemingly intended by the U.C.C.'s
original draftsmen.10'
99. For example, compare the language of U.C.C. § 9-312(3) and P.P.S.A.. supra note
96, at § 34(2); U.C.C. § 9-204 and P.P.S.A., supra note 96, at §§ 12-15; U.C.C. § 9-105 and
P.P.S.A., supra note96, at § 1; U.C.C. §§ 9-312(5)& (6) and P.P.S.A.,supranote 96, at§ 35.
100. The same result could be accomplished by changing the language of section 9-306(3)
tA read a "security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest" and entitled
to the sante priority given the security interest in the original collateral. Of the two, revision of
section 9-312(3), if only for the sake of ease and clarity, would seem the preferable approach to
take.
101. ALI-ABA COURSE, supra note 67, at 215.
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C. A Third Alternative-Compromise
The civil law and the Ontario alternatives, as well as previous
interpretations of the U.C.C., have one thing in common-each has
assumed that either the assignee of accounts receivable or the
purchase money secured party must prevail. But another and equally
plausible alternative is some compromise between the two competing
interests. Such a solution would recognize the value of both interests
while concluding as a matter of policy that neither was of such nature
as to warrant special treatment. A compromise solution might be
reached in one of several ways.
One such solution might be to give the bank and the seller
priority in the accounts receivable to which both had claims in
proportion to the respective values of the bank credit extended or
inventory supplied. But there are difficulties with this solution. First, it
would produce twofold uncertainty for both the bank and the seller.
Each would be subject to the diminution of his interest as a
consequence of any additional advances by the other. Moreover, both
would face such a loss by the subsequent entry of a third creditor,
since, so far as the factors of filing, perfection, and attachment are
concerned, all secured parties are on equal footing under this
approach. In other words, the element of time would be immaterial to
the protection given the competing security interests. Another
difficulty with such an approach is the failure to take account of the
overall situation of the various creditors. For example, assuming all
the inventory delivered by the seller had been sold, the accounts would
constitute the seller's only remaining collateral.'
But he would be
required to share equally with the bank even though the bank might
have additional collateral in the form of accounts receivable created
by the retailer's sale of other inventory. Under other circumstances,
an equally unjust result could occur to the detriment of the bank.
While the latter objection might be avoided simply by changing the
source used to determine the respective shares, it seems that any
compromise involving a sharing of the accounts would necessarily fail
to dispel the uncertainty created by the instant solution. Because of
the reluctance of both banks and suppliers of inventory to extend
credit in the face of this uncertainty, it would appear that this solution
is unsatisfactory.
102.

The seller would have some limited claim to cash proceeds, but because of the

difficulties of tracing, it is not unreasonable to disregard this source. See U.C.C. § 9-306.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The conflict between a purchase money security interest in
inventory and proceeds and an antecedent security interest in accounts
receivable is not resolved under the current provisions of the U.C.C.
Under section 9-312, the U.C.C. gives a seller of inventory a purchase
money security interest that takes priority over all competing security
interests in inventory. Section 9-306 gives the same seller a
continuously perfected security interest in any proceeds that result from
the debtor's disposal of the inventory. Yet, because section 9-312 fails
explicitly, to provide for priority of the seller's security interest in the
proceeds as well as the original collateral and because section 9-306 is
silent with respect to any continuing priority, the answer to the
question whether such a seller would take priority over one holding an
earlier security interest in accounts receivable is uncertain.103
The solution to our hypothetical under the Ontario Act is
consistent with the fundamental policy underlying the pre-Code
development of both accounts receivable financing and the purchase
money security interest. Like the U.C.C., the Personal Property
Security Act of Ontario recognizes and gives effect to the importance
of accounts receivable as a business asset, and provides for the use of
such accounts as a means of obtaining needed credit. Similarly, the
Ontario Act recognizes the favored treatment afforded the purchase
money security interest for over 300 years by giving priority
to such a security interest even as against antecedent claims. The
alternative solution embodied iii the Ontario Act is preferable to that
existing under the current provisions of the U.C.C. With the
exception of its solution to our hypothetical, the Ontario Act's
general approach to accounts receivable financing and to the purchase
money security interest is similar to the U.C.C. approach. However,
the Ontario Act has the advantage of giving a definite solution to our
hypothetical. Certainly the Ontario solution is consistent with the
favored treatment long given the purchase money secured party.
Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the development of accounts
receivable financing. By allowing a purchase money secured party to
continue his security interest and priority into accounts receivable as
proceeds, the Ontario Act recognizes the validity of accounts
receivable financing to no less extent than it would if priority were
given to one taking his security interest in accounts as original
103.

ALI-ABA

COURSE,

supra note 67, at 215 (comment of Professor Gilmore).
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collateral. In either case, the accounts serve to secure additional credit
for the assignor of the accounts. Because the question is purely a
question of priority, the Ontario Act gives full recognition to and
carries forward the fundamental aspects of both the purchase money
security interest and accounts receivable financing.
HOWELL J. REEVES

